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Veniet Tempus (QNat. 7.25)
Stoic Philosophy and Roman Genealogy in Seneca’s View
of Scientic Progress∗
Fabio Tutrone
1. Decolonizing progress: from Condorcet to Seneca
«The idea of human Progress is a theory which involves a synthe-
sis of the past and and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an
interpretation of history which regards men as slowly advancing –
pedetemptim progredientes – in a denite and desiderable direction,
and infers that this progress will continue indenitely». At the be-
ginning of his inuential reconstruction of the history of the idea of
progress, the twentieth-century apostle of positivistic progressivism
John Bagnell Bury dened the object of his inquiry in these highly
solemn terms. And he went on observing that progress «must be the
necessary outcome of the psychic and social nature of man; it must
not be at the mercy of any external will; otherwise there would be no
guarantee of its continuance and its issue, and the idea of Progress
would lapse into the idea of Providence».1
Until the very recent past, most Western readers – including clas-
sical scholars – would have substantially agreed with this apparently
“universal” denition, which echoes the faith of many generations
of intellectuals – from Condorcet and Comte to Spencer and the so-
called classical liberals.2 Still in the Nineties, Robert Nisbet started
his comprehensive survey by maintaining that «the history of all that
is greatest in the West – religion, science, reason, freedom, equality,
∗ During the preparation of this article, I beneted from many helpful sugges-
tions of other scholars, to whom I would like to express my sincerest gratitude. Special
thanks are due to Harry Hine, David Konstan, and Giusto Picone for their friendly and
insightful advice. Needless to say, all mistakes and omissions are my responsibility
alone.
1. Bury 1920, 5.
2. Among the several scholarly works dealing with the history of the notion of
progress, those of Almond, Chodorow, and Pearce 1982, Marx and Mazlich 1996,
and Burgen, McLaughlin, and Mittelstrass 1997 are especially valuable for the
critical (and often deconstructive) insights they provide.
Fabio Tutrone
justice, philosophy, the arts, and so on – is grounded deeply in the
belief that what one does in one’s own time is at once tribute to the
greatness and indispensability of the past, and condence in an ever
more golden future». Nisbet claimed that man has an intrinsic need for
this fundamentally benecial «dogma of progress», as he called it, and
foreshadowed the collapse of the Western world under the pressure of
other more “progressive” civilizations: «our problem in this nal part
of the twentieth century is compounded by the fact that the dogma of
progress is today strong in the ocial philosophies or religions of those
nations which are the most formidable threats to Western culture and
its historical moral and spiritual values».3 Such an inextricable mixture
of ethnocentrism, progressivism and (admittedly phobic) millenarism
is indeed representative of what we might call the socio-cultural embed-
dedness of the concept of progress – a factor frequently overlooked by
historians of thought. In spite of Nisbet’s premonitions, there does not
seem to be a concrete danger that Western societies will disintegrate
because of a misappropriation of the faith in progress. Rather, there is
good reason to think that applying our culturally determined and rela-
tively recent view of progress – the post-Enlightenement teleological
paradigm summarized by Bury – to signicantly dierent cultures is
bound to generate serious misunderstandings.
The problem is especially evident in the case of non-Western soci-
eties, most of which have been long regarded (and implicitly blamed)
as «societies without history» or Naturvölker .4 Clearly, in the ethno-
3. Nisbet 1994, 8-9.
4. As Zimmerman 2001 pointed out, the traditional distinction of nineteenth-
century anthropology between “natural peoples” (Naturvölker) and “cultural peoples”
(Kulturvölker) had a notable impact also on classical scholarship, particularly in the
framework of Imperial Germany, where the so-called «science of antiquity» or Alter-
tumswissenschaft reached its acme. At that time, «anthropologists expected Africans,
indigenous Americans, Pacic Islanders, and marginalized societies in Europe and
Asia to be “natural peoples” (Naturvölker). Natural peoples supposedly lacked writing,
culture, and history and thus contrasted sharply with «cultural peoples» (Kulturvölker)
such as Europeans» (20). Notably, «Eduard Meyer, the great historian of Near Eastern
and classical antiquity, included a section called «Elements of Anthropology» at the
beginning of his great History of Antiquity, a section he expanded to over 250 pages
in the 1907 edition. [...] Very few societies, he argued, reach the point where they
have a high culture and an important historical role. Most societies are «history-less»
(geschichtslos), not only because they themselves do not record history, but also be-
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centric assessment of similar cultures, the idea of historical progress
worked as an allegedly universal criterion of primary importance –
and, consequently, as a conceptual barrier to cross-cultural interpre-
tations.5 But the question is equally relevant to the work of classical
scholars, whose main purpose is – or should be – the comprehension of
a chronologically and culturally distant world like the Graeco-Roman
civilization.6 It is indeed remarkable that almost all the investigations
of the ancient view of historical advancement have basically drawn a
comparison between the modern ideal of continuous tangible improve-
ment – a process supposed to ensue from the very nature of history
– and the Graeco-Roman discussions on the evolution (or involution)
of human life. As a rule, the explicit aim of similar investigations has
been to ascertain whether and to what extent the professions of faith
in the value of progress pronounced by classical writers meet the stan-
dards of our selective denition. And even if more prudent scholars
like Ludwig Edelstein have tried to rene their method of inquiry by
adopting a relatively broad denition (specically, that of Arthur O.
Lovejoy),7 a kind of modern-oriented teleology has remained central
cause even when they do undergo change it is merely a typical, rather than a unique,
development» (43-44).
5. Cf. e.g. Mazrui 1996, 153: «we need hardly argue [...] that the choice of
the West as the role model or ideal society is ethnocentric, while the idea that all
societies are evolving toward the same destination is universalist. The concept of
progress is therefore a dialectic between the universalism of process and the ethnocentrism
of destination» (author’s italics).
6. See now Bettini 2011, XIV: «the Greeks and Romans, though in some respects
very similar to us, most often conceived things in a much dierent way than we
do, and are able, therefore, to open our eyes to so many “possibilities” of life that
otherwise we might not be able to see. The Greeks and the Romans told exciting – yet
dierent – stories. They elaborated profound – yet dierent – symbols. Above all, they
confronted problems in many ways similar to those we nd ourselves confronting
today [...] yet with a dierent approach, because their worldview and the resources of
their culture were dierent than ours». Cf. also Settis 1996b, and Hartog 1996.
7. According to Lovejoy and Boas 1935, I, 6, the idea of progress – an idea one
might legitimately look for in pre-modern times – is simply that of «a tendency inher-
ent in nature or in man to pass through a regular sequence of stages of development in
past, present, and future, the later stages being – with perhaps occasional retardation
– superior to the earlier». On the basis of this rather looser denition, Edelstein 1967
(who was himself a member of the famous History of Ideas Club founded by Lovejoy)
advocated the presence and relevance of the notion of progress in classical antiquity –
contra Bury 1920 and his widely shared Comtian approach. According to Edelstein,
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to the approach of classicists.8
As part of a post-modern globalized society that has tragically
experienced the limits of Western progress and its awkward exporta-
tions, we should now be more interested in the meaning of alternative
paradigms. To a great degree, the ancients’ reection on cultural de-
velopment – a reection wide enough to include ethical, scientic and
epistemological matters – must be regarded as pertaining to a dier-
ent cultural code. And instead of focusing on those elements which
possibly “anticipate” a standard positivistic view, we should endeavor
to understand the social and intellectual factors underlying textual
representations. In the present paper, I shall investigate the represen-
tative case of Seneca, the thinker who, in Edelstein’s words, «gives a
clearer and more comprehensive picture of what the ancients meant by
progress than does any other author».9 I will devote special attention
to the text of the Natural Questions, since this is probably the treatise
which provides the most striking and revealing evidence on Seneca’s
view of progress – particularly scientic progress, in the proper sense,
though, as we shall see, the question intrinsically involves moral and
epistemological issues.
I will argue that Seneca devises a broadly conceived spectrum of
progress, which reects both his adherence to Stoic philosophy and
his careful assimilation of Roman cultural models. On the one hand,
Seneca emphasizes man’s vocation to strive for scientic knowledge
«the ancients formulated most of the thoughts and sentiments that later generations
down to the nineteenth century were accustomed to associate with the blessed or
cursed word – “progress”» (XXXIII).
8. This is true also of the brilliant survey of Dodds 1973. Compared to Edelstein,
Dodds further restricts the range of periods and contexts in which it is possible to
identify ancient ideas of progress (of course, in the modern sense). What is more, even
if he highlights «the slippery nature of the concept itself» and warns that «this is a
eld where generalization is more than commonly hazardous», he basically assimilates
the Graeco-Roman world to «history-less», primitive cultures: «in primitive societies,
custom-bound as they are and lacking historical records, progress does not readily
develop a generalized meaning. Such societies may ascribe particular inventions or
discoveries to individual culture-heroes or culture-gods, as popular Greek belief did
from the Archaic Age onwards; but they do not think of them as forming a continuous
ladder of ascent, and still less do they conceive such a ladder as extending into the
present and the future».
9. Edelstein 1967, 169.
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and his need to costantly make an inner advance towards wisdom,
engaging in a creative exposition of Stoic ethics and natural theology.
While so doing, he seems to react against the idealization of primitive
times as an age of true wisdom (in the “technical” Stoic sense) put
forth by other contemporary Stoics such as Chaeremon and Cornu-
tus (and presumably already expressed in the Middle Stoa). On the
other hand, Seneca’s insistence on the communal and intergenerational
character of progress – which depends on the view that ethical and
physical knowledge are a non-individual heritage to be preserved and
improved – echoes a deep-rooted belief of Roman society: the typi-
cally aristocratic concept of linear transmission and intergenerational
competition, which plays a central role in Latin public and private
morality. In addition, the bold claims about future discoveries made in
the Natural Questions can be organically connected to the tradition of
Hellenistic science and its methodological optimism.
Thus, once again, the idea of progress and its literary elaboration
appear to be socially and culturally embedded. In order to understand
Seneca’s particular standpoint as a Roman Stoic, we need to decolonize
the (clearly superimposed) notion of positivistic progress and forsake
any teleological presumption.10 Indeed, Seneca and those ancient
authors who proclaimed their faith in a benecial development of
knowledge (whatever subject eld they referred to) have often been
regarded as the ancestors of our idea of progress – or, by contrast,
dismissed from such a privileged position – in an attempt to present
antiquity as the “root” of later identities.11 What I shall attempt to
10. The usefulness of post-colonial interpretative approaches to the methodology
of classical studies is becoming more and more evident in contemporary debate, es-
pecially under the inuence of reception theories and as a response to the crisis in
traditional humanities: see e.g. Hose 1999, Hardwick 2004, Hardwick and Gillespie
2007, and Hardwick and Harrison 2013. On the distortions deriving from the (fre-
quently unconscious) adoption of a teleological perspective see the famous warnings
of Finley 1998, 85: what Finley calls the teleological fallacy «consists in assuming
the existence from the beginning of time, so to speak, of the writer’s values [...] and
in then examining all earlier thought and practice as if they were, or ought to have
been, on the road of this realization; as if men in other periods were asking the same
questions and facing the same problems as those of the historian and his world».
11. On the history of this identarian approach to ancient culture, from Renaissance
classicism to the Altertumswissenschaft and the crisis of the twentieth century, see
Romano 1997.
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do in this paper is to take Seneca’s condent assertions on the future
possibilities of knowledge as an intellectually daring combination of
literary, philosophical and social models: an ideological construct
notably dierent from the “progressive” views conceived since the
Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes.
While it is extremely interesting to investigate the modern re-
ception of Senecan progressivism as a typical case of classics-based
self-legitimation (an eort which, however, is beyond the scope of this
survey), one should carefully avoid following the inverse path and
starting with an a posteriori denition. Dierently from what Bury
and other scholars are inclined to argue, for instance, progress and
providence are not incompatible concepts. Rather, they are strictly
and harmoniously connected in Stoic philosophy. Likewise, Seneca’s
faith in scientic progress is not diminished by his lack of trust in
an ineluctable favorable development arising from history itself. To
all appearances, even if both Condorcet and Seneca expressed their
optimistic belief in the advent of a brighter time and employed a high
prophetic tone,12 they embodied two very dierent attitudes – two
very dierent cultures. It is the duty of conceptual history (or Begri-
sgeschichte, in Koselleck’s terms)13 to follow the changing routes of
words, paradigms, and expectations.
12. Cf. Seneca, QNat. 7.25.4: Veniet tempus quo ista quae nunc latent in lucem
dies extrahat et longioris aeui diligentia (the emphatic phrasing veniet tempus is given
further prominence by its anaphoric repetition at the beginning of the next paragraph:
veniet tempus quo posteri nostri tam aperta nos nescisse mirentur); J.-A.-N. de Caritat
Marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain
(1793), 498v: «Il arrivera donc, ce moment où le soleil n’éclairera plus sur la terre que
des hommes libres, ne reconnaissant d’autre maître que leur raison» (quoted from the
edition of Schandeler 2004, 435).
13. On the purposes and methods of Begrisgeschichte see the essays collected in
Koselleck 2002. The volume includes Reinhart Koselleck’s insightful discussion on
the notions of progress and decline (218-235), a discussion highlighting the fundamen-
tal changes introduced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: «the subject of
progress was expanded to become an agent of the highest generality, or one with a
forced claim to generality: it was a question of the progress of humanity. [...] The
chosen people of the Judeo-Christian heritage become the hypostasis of progress.
Soon one can also speak of the «progress of time» and much later, of «the progress of
history»» (230).
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2. Back and forth: Stoic approaches to moral and cultural
advancement
Among the most revealing peculiarities of Seneca’s attitude towards
scientic progress is an underlying acknowledgement of man’s epis-
temic limits. The future progress of natural knowledge is envisaged
and exalted in response to the admitted obscurity of several phenom-
ena. Other generations, Seneca states, will unveil what is now obscure,
in the same way as we have recently uncovered previously unknown
matters. There would be no need to wonder at contemporary ignorance
(and at the writer’s own inability to provide exhaustive explanations),
since one should regard physics as a transgenerational eort.
A case in point is the discussion on comets in Natural Questions
7 – the passage in which Seneca makes his most perspicuous and
celebrated claims about human progress. The author admits that the
course of comets is not as clear to us as that of planets, for «there are
many things whose existence we allow, but whose character we are
still in ignorance of».14 In order to demonstrate this epistemologically
relevant assumption, Seneca shifts the focus to the vexed question of
the nature of the soul, that is, from meteorology to psychology. As he
puts it, «we shall all admit that we have a mind (animus), by whose
behest we are urged forward and called back; but what that mind is
which directs and rules us, no one can explain any more than he can
tell where it resides».15 Seneca then goes back to the problem of comets
14. QNat. 7.25.1: multa sunt quae esse concedimus, qualia sint ignoramus. Transla-
tions from the Natural Questions are, with minor adjustments, those of Clarke 1910.
The Latin texts printed are based on a comparison between several modern editions
(above all, those of Oltramare 1929, Hine 1996, and Parroni 2002).
15. QNat. 7.25.2: Habere nos animum, cuius imperio et impellimur et reuocamur,
omnes fatebuntur; quid tamen sit animus ille rector dominusque nostri, non magis tibi
quisquam expediet quam ubi sit. Immediately thereafter, Seneca provides a short list
of psychological theories which is clearly indebted to the doxographic tradition (see
Mansfeld 1990, 3137-3140; and cf. Cicero, Tusc. 1.18-24). The use of such doxographic
materials, however, is intended to corroborate the author’s argument about the limits
of human knowledge, a theme central to the entire treatise. See Inwood 2005, 165:
«Seneca’s most important concern in the book as a whole is not the overt theme
(explanations of traditionally problematic natural phenomena) but the subterranean
theme of the relationship between god and man, and most particularly the epistemic
limitations of human nature».
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and heavenly bodies, and proclaims his faith in a gradual discovery of
truth:
Quid ergo miramur cometas, tam rarum mundi spectaculum, nondum
teneri legibus certis nec initia illorum nesque notescere, quorum ex
ingentibus interuallis recursus est? Nondum sunt anni mille quingenti
ex quo Graecia «stellis numeros et nomina fecit»,16 multaeque hodie
sunt gentes quae facie tantum nouerunt caelum, quae nondum sciunt
cur luna deciat, quare obumbretur. Haec apud nos quoque nuper ratio
ad certum perduxit.Veniet tempus quo ista quae nunc latent in lucem
dies extrahat et longioris aeui diligentia. Ad inquisitionem tantorum
aetas una non sucit, ut tota caelo uacet; quid quod tam paucos annos
inter studia ac uitia non aequa portione diuidimus? Itaque per suc-
cessiones ista longas explicabuntur. Veniet tempus quo posteri nostri
tam aperta nos nescisse mirentur. Harum quinque stellarum, quae se
ingerunt nobis, quae alio atque alio occurrentes loco curiosos nos esse
cogunt, qui matutini uespertinique ortus sint, quae stationes, quando
in rectum ferantur, quare agantur retro, modo coepimus scire; utrum
mergeretur Iupiter an occideret an retrogradus esset – nam hoc illi
nomen imposuere cedenti – ante paucos annos didicimus. [...] Erit
qui demonstret aliquando in quibus cometae partibus currant, cur tam
seducti a ceteris errent, quanti qualesque sint. Contenti simus inuentis:
aliquid ueritati et posteri conferant.
Why should we be surprised, then, that comets, so rare a sight in
the universe, are not embraced under denite laws, or that their
beginning and end are not known, seeing that their return is at long
intervals? It is not yet fteen hundred years since Greece counted the
number of the stars and named them every one. And there are many
nations at the present hour who merely know the face of the sky
and do not yet understand why the moon is obscured in an eclipse.
It is but recently indeed that science brought home to ourselves
certain knowledge on the subject. The day will yet come when
the progress of research through long ages will reveal to sight the
mysteries of nature that are now concealed. A single lifetime, though
it were wholly devoted to the study of the sky, does not suce for
the investigation of problems of such complexity. And then we never
make a fair division of the few brief years of life as between study
and vice. It must, therefore, require long successive ages to unfold
all. The day will yet come when posterity will be amazed that we
remained ignorant of things that will to them seem so plain. The ve
16. Cf. Virgil, Georg. 1.137.
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planets are constantly thrusting themselves on our notice; they meet
us in all the dierent quarters of the sky with a positive challenge
to our curiosity. Yet it is but lately we have begun to understand
their motions, to realise what their morning and evening settings
mean, what their turnings when they move straight toward us, why
they are driven back from us. We have learned but a few years ago
whether Jupiter would rise or set, or whether he would retrograde
the term that has been applied to his retirement from us. [...] Men
will some day be able to demonstrate in what regions comets have
their paths, why their course is so far removed from the other stars,
what is their size and constitution. Let us be satised with what we
have discovered, and leave a little truth for our descendants to nd
out.17
The same intriguing combination of scientic progressivism (em-
phasizing both past achievements and future possibilities) and episte-
mological anti-individualism underlies Seneca’s approach to natural
theology a few chapters later. We cannot see God, the writer argues,
though He is inherent in nature and is «the greater and better part of
His work» (maior pars sui operis ac melior), in terms of Stoic pantheistic
immanentism.18 So, we should not wonder if we do not have a full
understanding of certain heavenly res:
Quid sit hoc sine quo nihil est scire non possumus, et miramur si quos
igniculos parum nouimus, cummaxima pars mundi, deus, lateat! Quam
multa animalia hoc primum cognouimus saeculo, quam multa ne hoc
quidem! Multa uenientis aeui populus ignota nobis sciet; multa saeculis
tunc futuris cum memoria nostri exoleuerit reseruantur. Pusilla res
mundus est, nisi in illo quod quaerat omnis mundus habe[a]t. Non semel
quaedam sacra traduntur: Eleusin seruat quod ostendat reuisentibus;
rerum natura sacra sua non semel tradit. Initiatos nos credimus, in
17. QNat. 7.25.3-7.
18. QNat. 7.30.3. As Mazzoli 1984, 956-958, pointed out, similar descriptions
denote a rhetorically intense elaboration of Stoic pantheism and do not entail any sub-
stantial concession to Platonic dualism (pace Gauly 2004, 162-164, who reads Seneca’s
condence in future development as part of a general “eschatological” tendency con-
tradicting Stoic materialism). For a sound reassessment of Seneca’s relationship to
Stoic material cosmology see Wildberger 2006, who rightly maintains that even in
texts like Ep. 65 Seneca’s view «traditionelle stoische Position hinstellt, nicht weniger
monistisch oder dualistisch als das, was anderswo als Ansicht Zenons oder Chrysipps
referiert wird» (5).
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uestibulo eius haeremus. Illa arcana non promiscue nec omnibus patent;
reducta et interiore sacrario clausa sunt, ex quibus aliud haec aetas,
aliud quae post nos subibit aspiciet.
What that is, without which nothing is, we cannot know: and when
God, the greatest part of the universe, hides Himself, we are surprised,
are we, that there are some specks of re we do not fully understand?
How many animals we have come to know for the rst time in our
own days, how many are unknown even today! The people of a
coming day will know many things that are unknown to us. Many
discoveries are reserved for the ages still to be, when our memory
shall have perished. The world is a poor aair if it do not contain
matter for investigation for the whole world in every age. Some of the
sacred rites are not revealed to worshippers all at once. Eleusis retains
some of its mysteries to show to votaries on their second visit. Nature
does not reveal all her secrets at once. We imagine we are initiated
in her mysteries: we are, as yet, but hanging around her outer courts.
Those secrets of hers are not opened to all indiscriminately. They are
withdrawn and shut up in the inner shrine. Of one of them this age
will catch a glimpse, of another, the age that will come after.19
For the Stoic philosopher, nature is a divine shrine and men are
its hesitant initiates – their hesitation deriving from a blameworthy
yielding to vice. Most importantly, the path of initiation into the
secrets of the cosmos takes more than one lifetime and requires the
eorts of numerous generations. If man devotes himself to the edifying
investigation of phenomena, however, science will progress and cosmic
truths will be disclosed.
Similar optimistic assertions have oered an attractive basis for
interpreting Seneca as an «apostle of progress»,20 or even as a pacist
prophet «very close to the scientists of our day».21 Edelstein has gone
so far as to equate Seneca’s views with those of Condorcet and Kant:
19. QNat. 7.30.4-6.
20. Motto 1993, 22: «certainly a good case can be made for Seneca’s vital im-
portance as apostle of progress». However, Motto sensibly argues against a generic
assimilation of Seneca to modern progressivism: while the nineteenth century con-
ceived a «naïve credence in the involuntary and irrefrangible thrust of progress,
together with the idol of perfectibility», the Latin thinker «always recognized that
progress was merely a potential, that man had, by an eort of will, to discipline himself
to intellect and advancement» (30-31).
21. Cailleux 1971, 483: «il s’avère très proche des scientiques de notre temps».
Cailleux recalls Seneca’s censure of war in passages like QNat. 5.18 and describes
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like the eighteenth-century philosophes, our author would have insisted
«on the indissoluble union between intellectual progress and that of
liberty, virtue, and the respect for natural rights, and on the eects of
science in the destruction of prejudice»;22 what is more, Seneca would
have shared Kant’s idea that «all the characteristics of the human
species are represented not by any of of its members, but only by the
species itself».23 The most interesting aspect of Edelstein’s survey on
Senecan thought, however, is its attempt to identify the intellectual
background of the writer’s progressivism – since before undertaking
any comprehensive comparative analysis, one should endeavor to
understand the meaning of Seneca’s statements in light of their own
cultural milieu.
No doubt, Edelstein is right is pointing out the decisive inuence
of the Stoic tradition and its “developmental” approach to human life.
Both from the perspective of individual enhancement and that of cosmic
history, the Stoics seem to have emphasized the role of progress, that is,
of those gradual and continuous changes which lead to the achievement
of a purpose.24 As usual, the most compelling evidence comes from
the eld of language and theoretical vocabulary, since the Stoics make
a very telling use of the word piροκοpiὴ (“advancement”) as well as of
the verb piροκόpiτειν (“to advance”). The term piροκοpiὴ appears to be a
him as an enlightened scientist «résolument paciste». Similarly, Cailleux interprets
the claim that «the people of a coming day (venientis aevi populus) will know many
things that are unknown to us» as a prophecy of the diusion of knowledge among
ordinary people («la connaisance, d’abord apanage des sages, s’étendra au peuple:
vision prophétique», 480).
22. Edelstein 1967, 175. This is Bury’s description of Condorcet’s theory (cf.
Bury 1920, 210), quoted by Edelstein in order to show that Seneca’s and Condorcet’s
views are substantially the same. According to Edelstein, «for Seneca, the ideal of
progress was an expression of the highest aspirations of man and mankind, and in
explaining it and dening its scope he argued very much in the manner of the thinkers
in the eighteenth century who were preoccupied with the same ideal».
23. Edelstein refers to Kant’s anthropological discussion in Anthropologie in prag-
matischer Hinsicht (1798), whose last chapter (II Teil, E) bears the title Der Charakter
der Gattung.
24. In accordance with the approach elucidated in the rst paragraph, I use the
word progress in a very broad and intuitive sense, chiey for its direct heuristic value.
Even in the case of Stoic philosophy, recourse to a restricted, pre-xed denition would
simply impair our understanding of cross-border issues. For a general discussion of
the Stoics’ “progressive” reading of human agency, however, see Verbeke 1964.
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Hellenistic coinage which Cicero repeatedly translates as progressio or
progressus, especially with reference to Stoic doctrines.25 And indeed
the view of moral progress as a gradual development towards wisdom
plays a central role in Stoic philosophy, particularly from Chrysippus
onwards.26 As Geert Roskam pointed out, the Old Stoics «were able
to valorize the concept of moral progress without abandoning their
fundamental and contradictory bifurcation between good and evil, to
admit of an intermediate condition within a dichotomy of diametrically
opposed poles, to meet the common sense convictions and the generally
accepted moral dierentiation between men without giving up their
paradoxical thesis that all those who are not wise are alike mad».27
Although the attainment of Stoic virtue – and thereby the transition to
the blessed category of wise men – consists in a radical (and allegedly
unperceived) change in one’s inner status (μεταβολή),28 a laborious
25. Cf. Edelstein 1967, 146-147, Dodds 1973, 1-2, and Burkert 1997, 19, who also
remark on the use of ἐpiίδοσις (literally, “increase”) in classical Greek, a term which
later coexists with piροκοpiὴ. For Cicero’s rendering of piροκοpiὴ with progressio see
e.g. Acad. 1.20; Fin. 4.17; 37; 66-67; 5.58; O. 3.14; 17. For progressus see Tusc. 4.44, or
Nat. Deor. 1.15. Notably, Cicero’s contemporary, the Epicurean Lucretius, uses neither
progressio nor progressus, and employs progredi in an epistemological sense only once
(cf. 5.1453, the famous nale of Book 5). On Lucretius’ conception of progress and its
philosophical premises see STADERINI (this volume).
26. In von Arnim’s collection, most of the fragments dealing with ethical progress
are ascribed to Chrysippus (SVF 2-3), often on the basis of explicit quotations. How-
ever, according to Plutarch, Prof. Virt. 82F-83A (= SVF 1.234), Zeno of Citium had
already provided practical advice on how to perceive one’s moral progress. Verbeke
1964, 30-31 has cast doubt on Plutarch’s testimony in light of an extremely “rigorist”
intepretation of Zeno’s thought, but a good case has been made that «the Old Stoics
did admit of progress toward virtue but maintained that happiness, which attaches
only to virtue itself, is not achieved until one has reached complete virtue» ( Ramelli
2009, LIII). Ramelli convincingly ascribes this attitude to Zeno himself, referring to
the evidence provided by Zeno’s letter to Antigonus Gonatas (Diogenes Laertius, Vit.
7.8-9). See also Hahm 2002
27. Roskam 2005, 29. On the well-known Stoic paradox according to which those
who are not wise – including those who are progressing toward virtue – belong to
the class of “fools” (φαῦλοι) see SVF 3.524-539. Such a view is, of course, founded on
the assumption that all faults are equal, while virtue is a separate and perfect status.
This, however, does not contradict Chrysippus’ claim (Plutarch, Stoic. Rep. 1038E =
SVF 3.226) that Stoic virtues can «grow and progress» (αὔξεσθαι τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ
διαβαίνειν).
28. Cf. SVF 3.539-542.
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process of self-improvement is needed to reach such a nal goal. Men
in progress (the so-called piροκόpiτοντες or piελάζοντες) are expected
to build on their natural disposition (φύσις) with the help of culture
and education (μάθησις).29 This intermediate class of aspiring sages
– those who, dierently from deeply vicious persons, perceive their
faults and blame themselves – are indeed the addressees of Seneca’s
works, the procientes who can legitimately hope to learn virtue.30
According to Cicero’s exposition of Stoic thought, the fact that
man’s nature progresses further (ipsam per se naturam longius progredi),
so as to conrm and perfect reason, reects the providential plan of
God – that is to say, of the cosmic reason permeating man himself.31 In
the Stoic view, progress is one of the expressions of divine providence,
and roughly the same process can be observed on an individual and
universal level. Cicero clearly states that human history starts at some
point in the cosmic cycle when «a sort of ripeness for sowing the
human race» emerges. At that point, God «increases» the status of the
newly generated mankind through the providential gift of reason.32 In
29. See especially Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. 8.242.12-15 (= SVF 3.217); Cicero, Leg.
1.27 (= SVF 3.220) and Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.6 (= SVF 3.225).
30. As attested by Proclus, In Plat. Alcib. 3.158 (= SVF 3.543), the piροκόpiτων
diers from the wholly ignorant man (ἀpiαίδευτος) precisely because he realizes that
the cause of all his faults lies in himself. Of course, Proclus distinguishes the sage from
both these kinds of people, as «the perfecly educated man (piεpiαιδευμένος) blames
neither others nor himself» and stands out as a model of infallible virtue. Thus, even
in Proclus’ account, the fundamental distinction is a dichotomic one – that between
wisdom sensu proprio and the various degrees of vice. Seneca, too, maintains that the
man in progress belongs to the class of fools (qui procit in numero quidem stultorum
est), even if a large gap separates these two kinds of non-sages (Ep. 75.8). In the same
context (8-18), he proposes a thorough distinction between three types of procientes
which eloquently mirrors his deep-rooted interest in the problem of piροκοpiὴ (see
now Ware 2008). Like Proclus, Seneca highlights the importance of recognizing one’s
own errors in order to make progress (Ep. 50.1-4; 53.5-8). And as a follower of Stoic
intellectualism, he decisively proclaims that virtue is a matter of teaching, training,
and knowledge (e.g. Ep. 31.6-8; 50.7-9; 90.46; 95.55-64). See WILDBERGER 2013,
308-310.
31. Cicero, Leg. 1.27 (cf. above, n. 29).
32. Leg. 1.24: Nam cum de natura hominis quaeritur, haec disputari solent – et
nimirum ita est, ut disputatur – perpetuis cursibus conuersionibusque caelestibus exstitisse
quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in terras atque satum
diuino auctum sit animorum munere, cumque alia quibus cohaererent homines e mortali
genere sumpserint, quae fragilia essent et caduca, animum esse ingeneratum a deo.
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the same way as individual progress consists in the acknowledgement
and development of one’s rational nature, the historical advancement of
mankind descends from the acceptance and use of the divine λόγος.33
As we shall see, however, the Stoics were not unanimous in determining
which of the historical products of human rationality reect “correct
reason” (ὀρθὸς λόγος), and Seneca made a relevant contribution to
this debate in his Epistle 90. What is in any case worth noticing in view
of our present interest is that the Stoic conception of history postulates
a progressive development of human knowledge and expertise under
the benevolent guidance of cosmic reason.
Remarkably, it is not God that bestows knowledge on men once
for all, but it is mankind’s reason – being itself a spark of the divine
λόγος – which is called to discover the truth in accordance with God’s
plans. In his Stoic-inuenced didactic poem, for instance, Aratus of
Soli praises man’s achievements in the eld of astronomical knowledge
and highlights their benecial eects on the safety of navigation.34
According to Aratus (who starts his work with an emphatic invoca-
tion of Zeus, variously resembling Cleanthes), the twelve signs of the
Zodiac have been revealed by Zeus for the good of mankind.35 And
33. See Verbeke 1964, 28: «les Stoïciens reconnaissent dans le développement
de l’histoire culturelle, un progrès authentique, comparable à celui qui se réalise
dans l’évolution d’une existence individuelle. L’histoire n’est donc pas pour eux, le
simple dévoilement d’un contenu implicite, elle se présente au contraire comme un
progrès vital, comme une croissance biologique à partir d’un germe initial». In more
general terms, the whole Stoic account of cosmic history draws on a biological analogy
between macrocosm and microcosm, individual growth and universal evolution: see
Hahm 1977, 136-184 (who appropriately denes the Stoic theory as a «cosmobiology»),
and Seneca’s own analogical approach in passages like QNat. 3.23.2-3.
34. Phaen. 1.740-764.
35. Phaen. 1.1-18. As is well-known, Cleanthes, the author of a solemn Hymn
to Zeus carefully translated by Seneca (Ep. 107.11), was Aratus’ near-contemporary.
More generally, scholars have long recognized Aratus’ debt to Stoic philosophy: see
EFFE 1977, 40-56, D. Kidd 1997, 10-12, and Gee 2000, 66-91. Though some interpreters
have expressed their skepticism on this matter (see, most recently, Volk 2010, 201), it
is very dicult to deny the close similarity between Aratus’ view of Zeus and Stoic
natural theology. Neither is it fruitful to investigate the philosophical background of a
third-century author like Aratus in light of a supposedly unvarying “Stoic dogma”, for,
as Inwood 2005, 25, wisely claimed, «the picture that modern scholars have made for
themselves of an orthodox Stoicism teaching internally consistent doctrine» seems
rather «an artefact of our reconstructive methodology». This is especially true in
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even if some natural phenomena still escape human understanding,
one can legitimately expect that they will be gradually penetrated in
the future: as the poet puts it, «we men do not yet have knowledge
of everything from Zeus, but much still is hidden, whereof Zeus, if he
wishes, will give us signs anon; he certainly does benet the human
race openly, showing himself on every side, and everywhere displaying
his signs».36 A few decades before Seneca, another astronomical poet,
even more indebted to Stoic cosmology than Aratus, Marcus Manilius,
draws an analogous picture of the history of science and culture. For
Manilius, astronomical knowledge is a divine gift strictly connected
with the birth of civilization in the East.37 It was benecently revealed
by Hermes, at the time when nature disclosed herself (se ipsa reclusit)
and mankind overcame its original beastliness.38 Manilius puts special
emphasis on man’s intellectual eorts following this divine revela-
tion, and his Kulturenstehungslehre appears to combine the tenets of
Stoic providentialism with a form of anti-primitivistic progressivism.39
Moreover, when describing the rst men’s daring achievements in
elds like language, agriculture and navigation, the poet puts forth a
general principle of cultural history according to which «experience
always generates one skill from the other» (semper enim ex aliis alias
thecase of poets who are not philosophers sensu stricto, employ a variety of rhetorical
means, and reect several concurrent inuences.
36. Phaen. 1.768-772: piάντα γὰρ οὔpiω/ ἐκ Διὸς ἄνθρωpiοι γινώσκομεν, ἀλλ΄
ἔτι piολλὰ/ κέκρυpiται, τῶν αἴ κε θέλῃ καὶ ἐσαυτίκα δώσει/ Ζεύς· ὁ γὰρ οὖν
γενεὴν ἀνδρῶν ἀναφανδὸν ὀφέλλει/ piάντοθεν εἰδόμενος, piάντη δ΄ ὅ γε σήματα
φαίνων. Transl. D. Kidd 1997.
37. Astron. 1.25-112.
38. Astron. 1.30-45.
39. Astron. 1.66-112. Other possible sources for the author’s cosmology include, of
course, Hermetism and Pythagorizing Platonism. A thorough discussion of Manilius’
intellectual and philosophical background has been recently oered by Volk 2009,
according to whom «the Astronomica’s world view agrees with Stoic thought to such
an extent that it would seem appropriate to label the poet a Stoic and conclude that
the teachings of the school present a major – probably the largest – inuence on his
work» (231). Indeed, «in addition to the close relationship between macrocosm and
microcosm, which explains man’s innate capability for cosmological research and
insight, Manilius maintains that the divine universe is particularly eager to reveal
itself to human beings and calls on them – sometimes positively forces them – to
enter into some kind of interrelation with it» (222).
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proseminat usus).40 The verb proseminare (literally, “to sow”) recalls
the Stoic idea of “seminal” cosmic reason (λόγος σpiερματικὸς) acting
upon man and the whole of reality from within. At various points in his
Astronomica, Manilius proudly asserts that human rationality is part
of the divine λόγος and is therefore called to investigate nature.41 And
as the use of the adverb semper shows, such a process of discovery and
investigation does not concern only primitive mankind but stretches
indenitely forward into the future.
The evidence provided by Aratus and Manilius is relevant to our
discussion of Seneca’s opinions for two main reasons. First, both these
authors deal with astronomy (or, more properly, astrology) and other
related scientic subjects, and we have already noticed that Seneca’s
most striking assertions about human progress can be found in the
framework of astronomical expositions. Indeed, it is generally rec-
ognized that, especially since the Hellenistic age, ancient scientic
writers developed a strong belief in the continuous progress of knowl-
edge.42 A typical example is the second-century BC astronomer and
40. Astron. 1.90. The meaning of this sententia is even more evident if one con-
siders that it immediately follows a brief recapitulation of the history of primitive
progress: tum belli pacisque artes commenta vetustas («at that time, primitive mankind
discovered the arts of war and peace»). As Feraboli, Flores, and Scarcia 1996, 201,
remarked, «oltre ad alcuni aspetti precipui della losoa stoica, e a larghe tentazioni
“sincretistiche”, questa lettura storica del progresso costante dell’umanità applica con
docilità il modello interpretativo empirico, secondo cui carattere dominante della
cultura è il cumulo crescente delle esperienze organizzate».
41. See e.g. Astron. 2.105-135; 4.866-935. According to Romano 1979, Manilius’
view of rational knowledge, his emphasis on an original state of need, and his rejection
of the golden age myth combine the Stoic (especially Posidonian) account of civilization
with Hermetic beliefs which are in turn indebted to Aristotle’s De Philosophia. Though
the inuence of Hermetism on the Astronomica is indisputable, however, Stoic theories
of cultural history might well have amalgamated the idea of primitive χρεία with the
praise of man’s divine reason (a case in point is Cicero’s discussion in passages like
Tusc. 1.62-65, or Rep. 3.3, suitably recalled by Romano). And the fact that Manilius
does not take up Posidonius’ belief in a golden age could simply be read as proof of his
adherence to Stoic, non-Posidonian reconstructions, which were inevitably confronted
with Aristotelian theories (see, for instance, the Philonian account cited below, n. 51).
Interesting comments on the relationship between Aristotelian, Epicurean and Stoic
Kulturenstehungslehren can still be found in Grilli 1953.
42. See Edelstein 1967, 140-155, and Dodds 1973, 18. At the conclusion of his
survey, Dodds observes that «at all periods the most explicit statements of the idea
(scil. of progress) refer to scientic progress and come from working scientists or from
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geographer Hipparcus of Nicaea, who is said by Pliny the Elder to
have «listed the number of the stars for posterity’s sake» (adnumerare
posteris stellas).43 Hipparcus drew up a catalogue of the xed stars in
the hope that future scientists would use and possibly improve it: in
Pliny’s words, he «bequeated the sky as an inheritance for all» (caelo
in hereditate cunctis relicto), trusting in skilful successors.44 As attested
by the equally eloquent case of Archimedes,45 such an optimistic con-
dence in the progress of knowledge characterizes the Hellenistic (and
post-Hellenistic) tradition of naturalistic research – since it is part of
its empiric, non-dogmatic epistemology – and it is quite natural to
situate Seneca’s enthusiasm in this line of thought.
The second element which makes Aratus’ and Manilius’ texts rel-
evant to our analysis is, of course, their relation to Stoic thought. To
dierent degrees, they are aected by a progressive and at the same
time providential interpretation of cultural history which has been
typical of the Stoa since its very beginnings. Cicero’s above-mentioned
testimony on Stoic cosmogony nds an echo in Censorinus’ doxo-
graphic report about Zeno: according to the author of De Die Natali,
the founder of the Stoa «believed that the origin of mankind was estab-
lished out of a new world, and that the rst men were generated from
the soil with the assistance of divine re, that is, of the providence of
God».46 Both the description of Cicero and that of Censorinus imply a
writers on scientic subjects» (24). Remarkable evidence in this regard can already be
found in the fth-century BC writers of the Corpus Hippocraticum: see esp. Vet. Med.
2; 12; 14; de Arte 1.
43. HN 2.95. Interestingly, Pliny mentions Hipparcus’ provident work at the end
of his long discussion on comets (2.89-94). And, as mentioned earlier, Seneca’s most
detailed statements on future progress occur in a section dealing with the very same
topic.
44. Hipparcus took an analogous attitude towards the domain of cartography, as
Strabo, Geogr. 2.1.4 (= fr. 12 Dicks) reports that he suggested leaving unchanged the
old maps «until we can obtain more trustworthy information about them» (ἕως ἄν τι
piιστότερον piερὶ αὐτῶν γνῶμεν). Cf. Dicks 1960, 65.
45. In the introduction to his Method (2), Archimedes famously expresses his faith
in posterity: «I am persuaded that it (scil. the method) will be of no little service
to mathematics; for I apprehend that some, either of my contemporaries or of my
successors (τινας ἢ τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἐpiιγινομένων) will, by means of the method when
once established, be able to discover other theorems in addition, which have not yet
occurred to me». Transl. Heath 2007, 14.
46. De Die Nat. 4.10 (= SVF 1.124): Zenon Citieus, Stoicae sectae conditor, princi-
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reference to the Stoic doctrine of cosmic cycles – the well-known belief
in a periodical destruction and re-creation of the cosmos due to the
endless activity of the pneuma/re (namely, of the immanent God).47
Scholars have often regarded the Stoic idea of a cyclical conagration
(ἐκpiύρωσις) and regeneration (piαλιγγενεσία) of the universe as im-
plicitly contrasting with the notion of progress. And the importance
of Seneca’s claims on future science has been played down in light of
his acceptance of such an idea.48 However, as William Guthrie sharply
observed, what the ancients looked forward to in their discussions
on cosmic catastrophes «corresponds rather in modern terms to a fu-
ture ice-age or the eventual cooling of the sun; and neither of these
does much to curb our enjoyment of life or our zest for progress».49
Moreover, even if a cyclic view of natural history and a progressive
interpretation of culture may appear conicting to our mentality, it is
far from certain that the same diculty was perceived by ancient au-
thors. Again, as in the case of the concept of providence, the aprioristic
application of a standard modern paradigm is bound to undermine our
understanding of a peculiarly ancient representation – a representa-
tion in which teleology, epistemological optimism, and cosmological
cycling coexist.50
pium humano generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex solo
adminiculo divini ignis, id est dei providentia, genitos (my translation).
47. See now White 2003, 137-138, and Sellars 2006, 96-99. As Sellars remarks,
«rather than conceiving this as an endless series of cycles, one might instead conceive
it as a single cycle, repeated endlessly». For a detailed discussion of the extant sources
see Hahm 1977, 185-199.
48. In this respect, too, the position of Bury 1920, 15, is paradigmatic: after a brief
examination of Seneca’s views, Bury proclaims that «Seneca’s belief in the theory
of degeneration and the hopeless corruption of the race is uncompromising. [...] For
him, as for Plato and the older philosophers, time is the enemy of man».
49. Guthrie 1957, 78.
50. As Guthrie claimed, similar apparently opposing components often coexist in
modern theories as well. Even a herald of the modern ideal of progress like Nisbet
1994, 46, had to concede that there are «intimations of eventual ending of the world in
the writings of philosophers and scientists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
who are unambiguous in declaration of commitment to progress past, present, and
future». Nisbet’s concession is recalled by Motto 1993, 26-28, with special reference
to Seneca’s stand: «Seneca would surely have claimed that vast universal cycles in no
way would intrude upon the individual’s capacity to make human progress. [...] And
he taught again and again that humans could transmit knowledge and train themselves,
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Not only did the Stoics maintain that man was called to life and
rational knowledge by divine benevolence, but they also made explicit
that such a logical essence entailed the simultaneous development
of the arts. At the end of a long treatment traditionally traced back
to Zeno – a treatment intended to prove the cosmos’ perishability –
Philo of Alexandria provides relevant information on the Stoic view
of human civilization.51 Of the four dierent arguments reported by
Philo, in fact, the last one concerns the status of man as a recently
created animal, endowed with rationality and an innate inclination to
technical knowledge:
If the world were eternal then the animals also would be eternal, and
much more the human race, in proportion as that is more excellent
than the other animals (ὅσῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄμεινον);52 but, on the
contrary, those who take delight in investigating the mysteries of
nature (τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐρευνᾶν τὰ φύσεως) consider that man
has only been created in the late ages of the world (ὀψίγονον); for
it is likely, or I should rather say it is inevitably true, that the arts
co-exist with man, so as to be exactly co-eval with him (ἀνθρώpiοις
συνυpiάρξαι τὰς τέχνας ὡς ἂν ἰσήλικας), not only because method-
ical proceedings are appropriate to a rational nature (λογικῇ φύσει
τὸ ἐμμέθοδον οἰκεῖον), but also because it is not possible to live
without them (ζῆν ἄνευ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν).53
A similar picture is entirely consistent with the Old Stoa’s cosmol-
ogy and anthropology. At the beginning of each cosmic cycle, mankind
that progress was indeed the hallmark and the imperative for homo sapiens». See also
Edelstein 1967, XXI-XXII, and Dodds 1973, 22.
51. Philo, Aet. Mund. 130-131 (= SVF 1.106). The attribution of the Philonian
excerpt (117-131) to Zeno was rst proposed by Zeller 1876 on the basis of a highly
sophisticated reasoning, and the passage is included among the Zenonian fragments
in the collection of Von Arnim as well as in the work of Pearson 1891, 106-116.
Despite the objections of Diels 1879, 106-108, and Wiersma 1940, Zeller’s attribution
is still accepted by most scholars (see, for instance, Graeser 1974). For the purposes
of the present analysis, it may suce to remark with Runia 1986, 82, that the four
arguments discussed «undoubtedly contain Stoic elements», and that the doctrine
of the destructibility of the cosmos is typical of the Old Stoa (while it is denied by
Panaetius and other later Stoics).
52. Note the inclusion of a typically Stoic (and originally Zenonian) anthropocen-
tric perspective: cf. Sedley 2007, 223-238.
53. Transl. Yong 1854-1890.
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arises from the earth under the guidance of God, who permeates the
earth itself in the form of seminal reasons.54 Even more importantly,
man participates in divine reason, and his rational nature (λογικὴ
φύσις) is teleologically led to full its proper vocation (what is οἰκεῖον
to human beings, as Philo says hinting at the process of οἰκείωσις).55
Such a vocation clearly consists of a methodical use of rationality –
to preserve the language of the Philonian account – and explains the
origin of the arts, which are inherent in mankind and necessary to its
life.
To be sure, the practice of technical knowledge primarily depends
on the use of those natural resources that, according to the Stoics, exist
for man’s sake.56 Replying to their Academic opponents who protested
that many aspects of nature are useless or even noxious to man, the
Stoics said that the usefulness of several beings will become clear in
the future: as Lactantius put it, the purpose of such beings «shall be
discovered over the course of time (processu temporum), in the same
way as~necessity~and use (necessitas et usus) have already discovered
many things which were unknown in former ages».57 This is the
view of cultural history and social epistemology poetically elaborated
by Aratus and Manilius – a view remarkably keen to highlight the
importance of cognitive progress.
However, in the tradition of Stoic thought (and in the works of
54. Censorinus’ above-cited report can be usefully compared to a passage in
Origines, C. Cels. 1.37 (= SVF 2.739). According to Origines (who intends to corroborate
his Christian view through a reference to the Stoic tradition), the rst men were born
«from the earth, thanks to the seminal reasons lying in it» (ἀpiὸ γῆς, σpiερματικῶν
λόγων συστάντων ἐν τῇ γῇ)
55. Sedley 1998, 333, is surely right in pointing out that «the language of the
entire passage is primarily Philo’s own». And it seems clear that Philo’s exposition
also includes post-Zenonian elements (for instance, in the third argument, the «formal
extension of pneuma, in varying states of tension, beyond living beings to become
universal causal agents, is hard to date earlier than Chrysippus»). But this does not
contradict the assumption that Philo (who claims to rely on a Theophrastean excerpt)
bears witness to genuinely Stoic doctrines.
56. On the the radical anthropocentrism of Stoic cosmology and natural philosophy
see Dierauer 1977, 238-245, and Sorabji 1993, 122-133. Cf. also above, n. 52.
57. Lactantius, Ira Dei 13 (= SVF 2.1172). Lactantius’ account is especially reliable,
as he reports the Stoic claim in spite of his preference for a dierent argumentative
strategy.
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Seneca himself), the notion of art (τέχνη) is particularly controversial.
First and foremost, it refers to the very practice of philosophy, which
the Stoics famously dened as an art of living (τέχνη piερὶ τὸν βίον).58
As John Sellars has shown in great detail, Stoicism advocated «a con-
ception of philosophy as an art (τέχνη) concerned with one’s way of
life (βίος) and involving two components, philosophical theory (λόγος)
and philosophical exercise (ἄσκησις)᾿᾿.59 In his Epistles, Seneca reacts
against any excess intellectualism (with special reference to Aristo of
Chios’ denial of the importance of precepts) and claims that «philoso-
phy is both theoretical and practical», as it «contemplates and acts at
the same time».60 The Roman writer agrees in qualifying philosophy as
an art of living (ars vitae)61 and declares that human beings, who have
received the divine gift of reason, should perfect their rational nature
by making constant progress on the path to wisdom. As a gradual
and contemplative understanding of the divine cosmos (leading to the
assimilation of specic skills), physical knowledge is central to this
purpose. And the progress envisaged in the Natural Questions appears
to be at the same time personal and communal, moral and scientic.62
As I hope to have shown so far, the heritage of Stoic physics, ethics
and epistemology plays a prominent role in the background of Seneca’s
assertions on progress. On the whole, the traditional doctrines of the
Stoa, going back to the teachings of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysip-
58. See e.g. Sextus Empiricus, Math. 11.170 (= SVF 3.598), and Epictetus, Diss.
1.15.2.
59. Sellars 2003, 78.
60. Ep. 95.10: Philosophia autem et contemplativa est et activa: spectat simul agitque.
The question of the role of general principles (decreta) and practical precepts (praecepta)
is dealt with extensively in Ep. 94 and 95. Generally speaking, as Sellars 2003, 77,
remarked, «Seneca argues that precepts are not for the sage who already enjoys secure
knowledge, but rather for those who are “making progress” (piροκοpiὴ, procientes)».
For a thorough discussion of Seneca’s standpoint (which has actually originated
diverging interpretations) see Mitsis 1993 and Inwood 2005, 95-131.
61. See esp. Ep. 95.7-9 (but cf. also Lactantius, Div. Inst. 3.15.1 = fr. 17 Haase).
62. See Inwood 2005, 200: «the work (scil. the Natural Questions) oers the reader
striking consolation for the fear of death; a sober analysis of the relationship between
the cosmic order and human life; challenging epistemological reections, focusing
on the ambivalent nature of human knowledge in a cosmos which is rational but not
fully open to our enquiring minds; and a sustained meditation on the relationship of
man to a rational god, providential but disinclined to reveal the truth except through
his orderly and causally determinate works».
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pus, provide solid ground for the author’s faith in the development of
knowledge, a development aecting both the life of individuals and
the course of history. Nevertheless, scholars have sometimes tended
to see the roots of Seneca’s attitude in the much more problematic
legacy of the Middle Stoa. This is, above all, the opinion of Edel-
stein, according to whom the works of Seneca, Manilius and Pliny
the Elder (an author we shall now focus on more carefully) «must
reect the common philosophy of the Middle Stoa». Edelstein refers
specically to the inuence of Panaetius and Posidonius, who are said
to have put forth «the law of endless advance», thus refashioning
their school’s thought.63 As in other analoguous exercises of Quellen-
forschung carried out by nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars,
special importance is attached to the inuence of Posidonius, who
is even regarded as «the culmination of the progressivism that char-
acterized the main.philosophical systems of the second half of the
Hellenistic period».64
Despite his condence in the possibilities of a purely “phylogenetic”
reconstruction, however, Edelstein himself admits that «none of the
fragments surviving from the Middle Stoa expresses an opinion about
the duration of progress in the future». Furthermore, the arguments
concerning Posidonius’ ascendancy over Manilius and Pliny are notably
weak, for Edelstein can only claim that «Manilius depends, if not on
Posidonius, then certainly on Stoic writers» and that Pliny mentions
Posidonius in Book 2 of his Natural History.65 As concerns the case
of Seneca, Edelstein’s thesis is even more unconvincing, especially in
light of the present-day orientation of scholarship – so that, generally
speaking, the hypothesis of an overwhelming Posidonian progressivism
seems rather an echo of that “Panposidonianism” which Edelstein’s
own edition contributed to discredit.66
63. Cf. Edelstein 1967, 168-169: «among later Stoics writing in the early rst
century after Christ and about the middle of that century and under the inuence of
Panaetius as well as Posidonius the law of endless advance is common property».
64. Edelstein 1967 177-178.
65. Edelstein 1967 168-169.
66. As is well-known, Edelstein’s collection of Posidonius’ fragments (carefully
completed by I. G. Kidd after Edelstein’s death) reacted against the long-standing
tendency of philological Quellenforschung to ascribe to the Apamean a series of
disparate (and often inconsistent) doctrines on the basis of indirect sources. By
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In the last decades, it has become increasingly clear that Seneca’s
stance on issues like progress, wisdom, and technical knowledge dif-
fers substantially from that of Posidonius, and it sounds much more
reasonable to compare the Latin writer’s approach to the traditional
outlook of the Stoa. Admittedly, Stoicism was a uid trend, and its
many-centuried history led to the emergence of dierent strains of
thought towards which Seneca took a critical and selective attitude.67
With regard to the problem of the arts and their historical develop-
ment, Seneca’s disagreement with Posidonius emerges incontrovertibly
from the famous Epistle 90. This is probably the most unambiguous
point in a text which has given rise to several diverging readings,68
for after drawing an idyllic picture of the early men’s life during the
golden age and describing the ruinous rise of avarice (90.4-6), Seneca
devotes his argumentative eorts to confute Posidonius’ view that the
arts originated from philosophy (that is, from true wisdom).69 Signif-
icantly, a circumstantial criticism of Posidonius’ ideas occupies the
very centre of the letter (7-35), which thus seems to have a strong
polemic character.70 Seneca’s main purpose is to show that banausic
activities like architecture and metallurgy do not reect “correct rea-
son” (ὀρθὸς λόγος), in the Stoic sense, but a practical and ultimately
harmful form of reasoning: as he puts it, «all such arts were found
contrast, Edelstein and I. G. Kidd 1972-1989, XVII-XXI, chose to include in their
edition «only those fragments attested by ancient writers», and complained about the
«era of extreme Panposidonianism» already criticized by scholars like Dobson 1918 –
an era which now seems to have come to an end.
67. This interpretative perspective underlies, for intance, the stimulating works of
Inwood 2005 (cf. above, n. 35) and Wildberger 2006, who both highlight Seneca’s
engagement with early Stoic philosophy.
68. A complete discussion of the wide-ranging bibliography dealing with Seneca’s
Epistle 90 would be out of place here, since I am only going to focus on a few relevant
aspects of the text. It may suce to recall the analyses of Blankert 1940, Bertoli 1982,
Pfligersdorffer 1982, and Hine 1995, to get a sense of the dierent interpretations
proposed by scholars in the past. The most recent discussion of the letter, however, is
that of Zago 2012, who carries out a careful survey of the writer’s sources.
69. Ep. 90.7: Artes quidem a philosophia inventas quibus in cotidiano vita utitur non
concesserim, nec illi fabricae adseram gloriam.
70. On this and other aspects I follow the highly persuasive interpretation of
Boys-Stones 2001, 18-27, which is in turn indebted to the insights of Frede 1989,
2088-2089 (pace Van Nuffelen and Van Hoof 2013).
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out by human shrewdness, not by wisdom».71 The only art which is
really worth man’s endeavors is philosophy, seen as an arduous but
extremely rewarding path to virtue – and the denition of virtue as the
most admirable product of training and education, in contrast with an
innatistic and primitivistic conception, constitutes the second, strictly
related purpose of the epistle.72
As George Boys-Stones pointed out, Seneca’s refutation of Posido-
nius’ theories concerns not only the status of banausic arts, but also the
view of moral perfection (virtus or sapientia) as a natural and primitive
condition.73 In the nal section of the letter, Seneca claims that only
a soul trained and brought to perfection by unremitting exercise can
reach virtue, while in spite of their outward appearance the rst men of
the golden age were not wise, in the proper sense: they were «innocent
on account of their ignorance».74 In all likelihood, this sharp theoretical
conclusion is aimed at rearming the early Stoic conception of moral
good against Posidonius’ assumption that primitive mankind possessed
a true form of wisdom.75 As Michael Frede remarked, «Posidonius,
71. Ep. 90.11: Omnia enim ista sagacitas hominum, non sapientia invenit. As
Romano 2005 observed, the author’s approach is representative of the wider Roman
debate on the role of praxis and theory, science and technology.
72. This emerges quite clearly from the introductive (1-3) and conclusive (34-46)
remarks which frame the letter.
73. Cf. Boys-Stones 2001, 23-24: «the issue in which Seneca is here interested is
the question of whether philosophy was responsible for the invention of the arts, and
he wants to be able to say that it was not, whether or not there were any sages at this
time anyway. [...] Of course, the question of whether there were philosophers among
early men will become relevant later on in the letter, and when it does, Seneca makes
his position perfectly clear».
74. Ep. 90.46: Ignorantia rerum innocentes erant; multum autem interest utrum
peccare aliquis nolit an nesciat. Deerat illis iustitia, deerat prudentia, deerat temperantia
ac fortitudo. Omnibus his virtutibus habebat similia quaedam rudis vita: virtus non
contingit animo nisi instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto.
Ad hoc quidem, sed sine hoc nascimur, et in optimis quoque, antequam erudias, virtutis
materia, non virtus est.
75. Such a claim is explicitly (and somewhat emphatically) presented as Posidonian
in the rst part of the text (Illo ergo saeculo quod aureum perhibent penes sapientes
fuisse regnum Posidonius iudicat, 90.5). And the whole description of early human
history which concludes the letter (36-46) seems intended to reassess and correct
the Posidonian account reported earlier. Indeed, according to Strabo, Geogr. 16.2.24,
Posidonius believed that even the theory of atoms originated from Eastern wisdom,
long before the Trojan war.
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unlike his Stoic predecessors, assumed that this original system of be-
liefs amounted to more than, as we might say, sound and uncorrupted
common sense, a rm basis for a philosophical theory that would artic-
ulate it; he rather assumed that it amounted to wisdom itself, to what
philosophers ultimately are in search of, rather than to a mere stage
on the road to wisdom. [...] Posidonius may even have assumed that
by a study of the various traditions and their comparison one might
be able to reconstruct this original wisdom».76 In recent years, it has
been convincingly shown that such an archaeological-reconstructive
approach (as it were) to human wisdom had a noticeable impact on the
post-Hellenistic debate, and on Roman philosophy in particular.77
In the rst century AD, two other Stoic philosophers sharing the
same milieu as Seneca, Chaeremon and Cornutus, engaged in a com-
plex exegesis of myths and ancestral traditions in an attempt to recover
the treasures of early wisdom.78 While the allegorical interpretation of
myth of the Old Stoa apparently relied on the idea that primitive men
had a purer cognitive outlook (and thus a more correct understanding
76. Frede 1994, 5193-5194. This interpretation had already put forth in Frede
1989, with special regard to Chaeremon’s position. See also Van Sijl 2010, 84-86.
77. See esp. Van Nuffelen 2011, who suggests a revision of «the linear develop-
ment proposed by Boys-Stones, according to which the theory passed from Stoicism
to Platonism only in the late rst century AD» (28). Interestingly, Van Nuelen argues
that «the basic characteristics of the theory are already found in the Divine Antiquities
of Varro, a work to be dated to the early 40s BC», in which Stoic elements merge with
a predominant Platonic outlook. On Varro’s attitude to ethical and social progress see
now LEONARDIS (this volume).
78. On Chaeremon’s allegorical reading of ancient Egyptian culture and religion
see Frede 1989, 2085-2103. Thorough comments can also be found in the edition
by Van Der Horst 1984. On L. Annaeus Cornutus’ Compendium of Greek Theology
and its theoretical background see now the editions by Bush and Zangenberg 2010
and Berdozzo, Nesselrath, et al. 2009 (including several scholarly essays). A useful
contextualization of Cornutus’ method in the framework of the ancient debate on
myth and primitive knowledge is oered by Boys-Stones 2003 and Struck 2009. In
Cornutus’ opinion (Theol. Comp. 76), «the ancients (οἱ piαλαιοί) were not common
men, but they were able to grasp the nature of the cosmos (συνιέναι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου
φύσιν ἱκανοὶ) and inclined to discuss it philosophically through symbols and riddles
(piρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι piερὶ αὐτῆς εὐεpiίφοροι)».
Chaeremon’s and Cornutus’’ standpoints are particularly relevant to our analysis, as
they both were active in Rome in Seneca’s day: the former shared the Latin philoso-
pher’s task of lecturing Nero (cf. Suda, s.v. «Alexander the Aegean»), while the latter
(being himself an Annaeus) was a freedman or relative of Seneca.
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of divine nature, unfaithfully reported by later poets), both Chaeremon
and Cornutus claimed that early mankind possessed philosophical
knowledge sensu proprio.79 By contrast, in all of his works, Seneca ad-
vocates a developmental, non-spontaneistic conception of virtue which
seems closer to that of the rst Stoics. And it is indeed striking that
when he deals with the issues of allegoresis and etymology, he displays
a scornful and skeptical attitude which has been rightly contrasted
with Cornutus’ stance.80 Actually, Seneca goes so far as to criticize
Chrysippus’ own exegetical approach for the sake of an ethics-centred,
progress-oriented notion of philosophy.81
This last observation is particularly valuable to our discussion, as it
reminds us that, at least in some respects, Seneca is prepared to revise
even the tenets of the Old Stoa – to which he is usually true – in view
79. According to Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.28, «some of the later Stoics (τῶν
νεωτέρων Στωικῶν τινες) say that the rst men, who were born of Earth (γηγενεῖς),
were in intelligence (συνέσει) much superior to the present race, as one may see
from a comparison of ourselves with older men and with those heroes who, possessed
as they were of an extra organ of sense in their keenness of intellect (τι piεριττὸν
αἰσθητήριον σχόντας τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς διανοίας), could apprehend the nature of
divinity and conceive of certain of its powers» (transl. Hallie 1985, who oers a
satisfactory solution to the problems arising from a textual gap). While Seneca, Ep.
90.44, agrees that early men were «of lofty spirit and, so to speak, fresh from the
gods» (alti spiritus viros et, ut ita dicam, a dis recentes), he denies that all of them had
a perfect intellect (non erant ingenia omnibus consummata), since virtue is not a gift of
nature but an art (non enim dat natura virtutem: ars est bonum eri).
80. Remarkable evidence on this matter is oered by the author’s discussion of
the Graces myth in Ben. 1.3-4, as well as by his denigration of the so-called liberal arts
(including the exegesis of Homer’s poems) in Ep. 88. Cf. MOST 1989, 2048: «we can
discern in Seneca a conviction of the philosophical uselessness of allegoresis which is
quite the opposite of Cornutus’ view and which coheres well with Seneca’s lack of
sympathy for the traditional forms of ancient religiosity». Most perceptively points
to the concordance of Seneca’s philosophical and dramatic writings on this matter.
See also Torre 2003, and Ramelli and Lucchetta 2004, 327-336.
81. See, for instance, the remarks of Dawson 1992, 58, on Ben. 1.3.10: «his (scil.
Seneca’s) comment hides a revolution in Stoic sensibility; while Old Stoic etymology
drew upon an ever-present correspondence between word (logos), meaning (lekton),
and nature (physis) – a correspondence implied by Cornutus’ etymologizing – Seneca’s
criticism ignores such correspondences, reecting a loss of interest in the curious mix-
ture of Stoic physics and logic that supported Chrysippus’s, Balbus’s, and Cornutus’s
etymological hermeneutic». For the account of Balbus, Cicero’s Stoic spokesman, see
Nat. Deor. 2.60-71.
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of his preponderant interest in human progress. While Chrysippus is
said to have lled up his books with sillinesses (ineptiae) and stories
(fabulae), the Roman writer states his preference for those arguments
which can contribute to the reader’s moral enhancement.82 In more
general terms, Seneca does not hesitate to apply his progressive view
of knowledge to the history of Stoicism itself, and he presents his own
school as a community of inquirers autonomously advancing on the
basis of the teachings received. Such an idea is resolutely stressed in
Epistle 33, where the hierarchical structure of Epicureanism and its
fondness for inspiring maxims are sharply contrasted with the same
intergenerational model described in the Natural Questions:
«Hoc dixit Zenon, hoc Cleanthes». Aliquid inter te intersit et librum.
Quousque disces? Iam et praecipe. Quid est quare audiam quod legere
possum? «Multum» inquit «viva vox facit». Non quidem haec quae
alienis verbis commodatur et actuari vice fungitur. Adice nunc quod isti
qui numquam tutelae suae unt primum in ea re sequuntur priores in
qua nemo non a priore descivit; deinde in ea re sequuntur quae adhuc
quaeritur. Numquam autem invenietur, si contenti fuerimus inventis.
Praeterea qui alium sequitur nihil invenit, immo nec quaerit. Quid
ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si
propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista
moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas;
nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est.
«Thus said Zeno, thus said Cleanthes, indeed!» Let there be a dif-
ference between yourself and your book! How long shall you be a
learner? From now on be a teacher as well! “But why”, one asks,
«should I have to continue hearing lectures on what I can read?» «The
living voice», one replies, «is a great help». Perhaps, but not the
voice which merely makes itself the mouthpiece of another’s words,
and only performs the duty of a reporter. Consider this fact also.
Those who have never attained their mental independence begin,
in the rst place, by following the leader in cases where everyone
has deserted the leader; then, in the second place, they follow him
in matters where the truth is still being investigated. However, the
truth will never be discovered if we rest contented with discoveries
already made. Besides, he who follows another not only discovers
nothing but is not even investigating. What then? Shall I not follow
in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road,
82. Cf. Ben. 1.3.8-1.4.6.
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but if I nd one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel,
I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries
before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all;
it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even
for posterity to discover.83
For Seneca, Stoicism is not a sect of faithful believers entrusted
with the transmission and preservation of immutable doctrines. And
even if the picture of an authoritative, dogmatic Epicureanism drawn
in the letter may appear excessive,84 it is true that the multi-faceted
course of the Stoic tradition oered an especially suitable basis for
original (and even conicting) evolution. At the same time, it is dif-
cult to escape the impression that a further ideological component
supports the author’s conception of truth, autonomy, and research – a
component shaping Seneca’s original relationship to Stoic philosophy
and his openness to the future. In the nal section of this paper, I
will argue that such a component consists of a conscious (and, in my
view, brilliant) elaboration of Roman cultural patterns. Indeed, the
traditional aristocratic idea of a contentio between generations appears
to underly both the writer’s representation of the past and his reasoned
condence in posterity.
3. Vying for progress: Roman society and Senecan
epistemology
It is perhaps worth making clear that neither in the above-cited pas-
sages from theNatural Questions nor in any other Senecan text, progress
is presented as a spontaneous and inexorable force. On the contrary,
the path of decadence and corruption is always perceived as a possible
option, depending on man’s free choice. In his discussion of the nature
of comets, for instance, after foreshadowing the exciting possibilities
of physical research, Seneca complains about the shameful inclinations
of his contemporaries. Due to this general negligence, only the worst
vices are making progress (in processu sunt), while science and philoso-
83. Ep. 33.9-11. Here and elsewhere I use the translation of Gummere 1917-25,
with a few minor adaptations.
84. Cf. the “monarchic” description of the Epicurean school at Ep. 33.4. For a
sound reading and contextualization of Seneca’s testimony see Clay 1998, 56-57.
246
Veniet Tempus (QNat. 7.25)
phy go through a phase of decay.85 This is all the more regrettable, the
author says, in view of the enormous quantity of phenomena waiting
to be explained:
Philosophiae nulla cura est. Itaque adeo nihil inuenitur ex his quae
parum inuestigata antiqui reliquerunt ut multa quae inuenta erant
oblitterentur. At mehercule, si hoc totis membris premeremus, si in
hoc iuuentus sobria incumberet, hoc maiores docerent, hoc minores
addiscerent, uix ad fundum ueniretur in quo ueritas posita est, quam
nunc in summa terra et leui manu quaerimus.
Philosophy gets never a thought. And so it comes to pass that, far
from advance being made toward the discovery of what the older
generations left insuciently investigated, many of their discoveries
are being lost. But yet, on my soul of honour, if we urged on this task
with all our powers, if our youth in sobriety braced themselves to
it, if the elder taught it and the younger learned it, even then scarce
should we reach the bottom of the well in which truth lies. As it is,
we search for her on the surface, and with a slack hand.86
The ideal scenario for the progress of human knowledge is, again, a
kind of transgenerational chain – and even if a similar situation occurs,
the task assigned to mankind remains imposing. In his day, however,
Seneca can contemplate the deliberate degeneration of people who
are even unable to preserve the heritage received.87 In the author’s
view, man has the freedom to choose between vice and virtue, wisdom
and perversion, and the content of this choice is the most important
factor in the life of individuals as well as in the history of communities.
For the standards of positivistic theorists, such a lack of faith in the
“historical necessity” of progress excludes Seneca from the number
of true progressivists, and the same can be said of his focus on a
contemplative, non-technological form of cognitive enhancement – on
the lofty realm of sapientia, far beyond the practicalities of sagacitas.88
What is really important to notice, however, and what may lead to
85. QNat. 7.31-32.
86. QNat. 7.32.4.
87. The famous and discussed remarks (7.32.2) about the decadence of glorious
philosophical schools (Academics, Skeptics, Pythagoreans, Sextians) are especially
eloquent in this respect.
88. Cf. Bury 1920, 14-15. Needless to say, the meteorological investigations of
the Natural Quaestions embody the kind of rational and theoretical inquiries which a
247
Fabio Tutrone
an intellectually stimulating comparison between our culture and the
background of Latin authors, is that Seneca’s model of progress relies
on a culturally embedded conception of social evolution and personal
responsibility. In the same way as the Romantic and positivistic idea
of endless advance mirrors the faith of a bourgeois, individualistic
society, Seneca’s notion of progress reects (and re-uses) the patterns
of Rome’s patrilineal tradition.
It is certainly no accident that all the Senecan texts discussed so far
appeal to a common representation of the development of knowledge
across the ages. As a rule, the writer focuses on the vital relationship
between consecutive generations, repeatedly resorting to terms like
saeculum, aetas, or aevum – the typical Latin vocabulary for the concep-
tualization of time, deriving from the eld of social imagery.89 Though
magnicent goals are presaged for those who devote themselves to
research in the future, a profound consciousness of the insuciency
of individuals lays the foundations of Seneca’s statements. Everyone
has the exciting responsibility to increase the present state of things,
and his/her personal contribution is seen as unique and decisive. But
knowledge is not a matter of individual inquiry and single objectives.
Rather, it is the shared eort of a community which implicitly entrusts
each of its members with the preservation and enlargement of a her-
itage. Of course, it is everyone’s choice to accept or reject this task –
to widen or dissipate the patrimony accumulated over the course of
generations.
The inuence of this socially and symbolically central system of
beliefs on Seneca’s idea of progress comes out very clearly from Epistle
64, where the ethical ideal we have just outlined is explicitly traced
back to the prototype of the bonus pater familiae:
Veneror itaque inventa sapientiae inventoresque; adire tamquam mul-
wise man is expected to pursue. The Senecan sapiens scorns the world of banausic
arts, but is eager to emulate the supreme rationality of nature by contemplating and
understanding the cosmos. See now Williams 2012, 17-53.
89. For an illuminating discussion of the Roman representation of time and its
socio-anthropological background see Bettini 1986, 125-202. Throughout his text-
based review, Bettini highlights the impact of genealogical imagery on the Latin idea
of “vertical time” – a conception emerging from our literary sources, but primarily
exemplied by atavistic practices like the genealogical tree and the aristocratic funeral.
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torum hereditatem iuvat. Mihi ista adquisita, mihi laborata sunt. Sed
agamus bonum patrem familiae, faciamus ampliora quae accepimus;
maior ista hereditas a me ad posteros transeat. Multum adhuc restat
operis multumque restabit, nec ulli nato post mille saecula praecludetur
occasio aliquid adhuc adiciendi. Sed etiam si omnia a veteribus inventa
sunt, hoc semper novum erit, usus et inventorum ab aliis scientia ac
dispositio. Puta relicta nobis medicamenta quibus sanarentur oculi:
non opus est mihi alia quaerere, sed haec tamen morbis et temporibus
aptanda sunt. Hoc asperitas oculorum conlevatur; hoc palpebrarum
crassitudo tenuatur; hoc vis subita et umor avertitur; hoc acuetur visus:
teras ista oportet et eligas tempus, adhibeas singulis modum. Animi
remedia inventa sunt ab antiquis; quomodo autem admoveantur aut
quando nostri operis est quaerere. Multum egerunt qui ante nos fuerunt,
sed non peregerunt. Suspiciendi tamen sunt et ritu deorum colendi.
Quidni ego magnorum virorum et imagines habeam incitamenta animi
et natales celebrem? Quidni ego illos honoris causa semper appellem?
Quam venerationem praeceptoribus meis debeo, eandem illis praecep-
toribus generis humani, a quibus tanti boni initia uxerunt. Si consulem
videro aut praetorem, omnia quibus honor haberi honori solet faciam:
equo desiliam, caput adaperiam, semita cedam. Quid ergo? Marcum
Catonem utrumque et Laelium Sapientem et Socraten cum Platone
et Zenonem Cleanthenque in animum meum sine dignatione summa
recipiam? Ego vero illos veneror et tantis nominibus semper adsurgo.
Hence I worship the discoveries of wisdom and their discoverers;
to enter, as it were, into the inheritance of many predecessors is a
delight. It was for me that they laid up this treasure; it was for me that
they toiled. But we should play the part of a careful householder; we
should increase what we have inherited. This inheritance shall pass
from me to my descendants larger than before. Much still remains
to do, and much will always remain, and he who shall be born a
thousand ages hence will not be barred from his opportunity of
adding something further. But even if the old masters have discovered
everything, one thing will be always new – the application and the
scientic study and classication of the discoveries made by others.
Assume that prescriptions have been handed down to us for the
healing of the eyes; there is no need of my searching for others
in addition; but for all that, these prescriptions must be adapted
to the particular disease and to the particular stage of the disease.
Use this prescription to relieve granulation of the eyelids, that to
reduce the swelling of the lids, this to prevent sudden pain or a rush
of tears, that to sharpen the vision. Then compound these several
prescriptions, watch for the right time of their application, and supply
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the proper treatment in each case. The cures for the spirit also have
been discovered by the ancients; but it is our task to learn the method
and the time of treatment. Our predecessors have worked much
improvement, but have not worked out the problem. They deserve
respect, however, and should be worshipped with a divine ritual. Why
should I not keep portraits of great men to kindle my enthusiasm, and
celebrate their birthdays? Why should I not continually greet them
with respect and honour? The reverence which I owe to my own
teachers I owe in like measure to those teachers of the human race,
the source from which the beginnings of such great blessings have
owed. If I meet a consul or a praetor, I shall pay him all the honour
which his post of honour is wont to receive: I shall dismount, uncover,
and yield the road. What, then? Shall I admit into my soul with less
than the highest marks of respect Marcus Cato, the Elder and the
Younger, Laelius the Wise, Socrates and Plato, Zeno and Cleanthes?
I worship them in very truth, and always rise to do honour to such
noble names.90
Veneration of the past and faith in the future perfectly coexist in
this intense exhortation to wisdom. In the rst section of the letter,
Seneca had praised Quintus Sextius’ writings for their great paraenetic
force, as such writings show that virtue «is on high, but that it is acces-
sible to him who has the will to seek it».91 Indeed, according to Seneca,
the admiration of previous models and the contemplation of wisdom
(contemplatio ipsa sapientiae) should not be interpreted as a static or
paralyzing exercise; rather, they are intended to provoke an active
reaction and a fervent desire for emulation. As is well-known, a galva-
nizing mixture of imitation and emulation, reverence and competition,
underlied the ocial ideology of the Roman elites and played a central
role in Rome’s public morality. Greek authors were impressed by the
Romans’ eective and dynamic use of memory, a use originally at-
90. Ep. 64.7-10.
91. Cf. Ep. 5: Nam hoc quoque egregium Sextius habet, quod et ostendet tibi beatae
vitae magnitudinem et desperationem eius non faciet: scies esse illam in excelso, sed
volenti penetrabilem. No doubt, the distinctively Roman rmness of Sextian philosophy,
emphasized by Seneca in QNat. 7.32.2 (Sextiana nova et Romani roboris secta), derives
to a great extent from a similar approach. On the doctrines and history of the Sextian
school, founded by Quintus Sextius at the end of the Republic, see Lana 1973 and 1992.
On Seneca’s relationship to Sextian thought see Griffin 1976, 36-41, and Inwood
2005, 7-22.
250
Veniet Tempus (QNat. 7.25)
tested by the inveterate customs of noble families.92 Polybius provides
a famous description of the Roman aristocratic funeral and remarks on
the strictly related tradition of placing the ancestors’ wax masks in the
most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine.93
While depicting the use of such masks on the occasion of funeral pro-
cessions, the Greek historian puts special emphasis on the hortatory
value of traditional practices as well as on the fruitful intergenerational
competition they activate. By this means, Polybius argues, «the fame
of those who did good service to their country becomes known to the
people and a heritage for future generations (γνώριμος δὲ τοῖς piολλοῖς
καὶ piαραδόσιμος τοῖς ἐpiιγινομένοις). But the most important result is
that young men are thus inspired to endure every suering for public
welfare in the hope of winning the glory that attends on brave men».94
Our Latin sources clearly conrm – and substantially extend – such
a penetrating picture of Roman social agonism. Pliny the Elder oers
a nostalgic and celebrative reconstruction of those aristocratic houses
in which ancestor masks (imagines) worked as a moral warning: the
custom of axing such realistic portraits in the armaria was, according
to Pliny, «a great factor of incitement (stimulatio ingens), as everyday
the house itself reproached an unwarlike owner for walking into the
triumph of another».95 Even more notably, in the prologue to his War
with Iugurtha, Sallust reports the extension of this emulative spirit
to the entire community. After recalling the exempla of Q. Fabius
Maximus, P. Cornelius Scipio and other eminent men, who used to say
that «their hearts were powerfully inamed for the pursuit of virtue
whenever they looked at the masks of their ancestors» (so that their
ardor «could not be calmed until they had equalled the fame and glory
92. The importance of memory and memorial strategies to the history of Roman
culture has been properly highlighted by several studies. Regarding the early imperial
age (and Seneca’s own time), see e.g. Gowing 2005 and Li Causi 2012.
93. Hist. 6.53-54. On these customs and their remarkable symbolic relevance see
Bettini 1986, 186-193, and Picone 2012, IX-XII. A specic study of Roman ancestor
masks and their sociopolitical meaning (from the time of the Republic through late
antiquity) has been oered by Flower 1996.
94. Hist. 54.2. Transl. Paton 1922-27. On Polybius’ account and its deliberate
emphasis on the specicity of Roman culture see Champion 2004, 94-95, with further
references. See also Davies (this volume).
95. HN 35.7 (my translation).
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of their forefathers»),96 Sallust maintains that an analogous strategy
of imitatio/aemulatio was adopted by men of humble origin aspiring
to social ascent (the so-called homines novi). Such men were in fact
«accustomed to surpass nobility through virtue» (per virtutem soliti
erant nobilitatem antevenire) – and the Latin historian complains about
the paradoxical degradation of this competition in his own day.97
Similar texts provide us with an important background for the
interpretation of Seneca’s attitude, since in spite of their dierent
literary features and ideological aims, they bear witness to a culturally
relevant system of representations. As Epistle 64 shows, such traditional
models exert a profound inuence on the conceptual construction of
Seneca’s progressivism, and the Latin writer explicitly re-uses Rome’s
social imagery in order to impress the reader. Mutatis mutandis, the
lover of science and philosophy is assimilated to the head of a Roman
household, who is traditionally required to maintain and increase
his family’s wealth. It is no accident that another passage from the
Natural Questions usually cited as a proof of the author’s progressive
faith reveals a very similar conception of past legacies and future
possibilities. Before discussing in detail the main theories proposed by
Greek philosophers on the origin of earthquakes, Seneca pays tribute to
the rst men of science and exhorts us to consider their achievements
from a long-term perspective:98
96. Iug. 4.5-6 (my translation): nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maxumum, P. Scipionem,
praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, quom maiorum imagines
intuerentur, vehementissume sibi animum ad virtutem adcendi. Scilicet non ceram illam
neque guram tantam vim in sese habere, sed memoria rerum gestarum eam ammam
egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius sedari, quam virtus eorum famam atque
gloriam adaequaverit.
97. Iug. 4.7. Cf. Picone 2012, X : «paradossalmente, il certamen gloriae ac virtutis
si è ora volto in gara del vizio, e non solo tra i rampolli delle nobili famiglie ma anche
tra gli homines novi, che pure si erano resi protagonisti di un vivace rinnovamento
sociale e politico, trasferendo il modello della competizione fra le generazioni, non
praticabile per loro, privi di nobili antenati, nel confronto orizzontale inter aequales,
e cioè fra concittadini dello stesso saeculum». On Sallust’s ethics-centred reading of
time and cultural history see the contributions of Papaioannou, Seider and Davies
in this volume.
98. For a perceptive reading of this section of the Natural Questions, which is not
merely a doxographic exposition, see Hine 2006, 56-59, and Williams 2012, 213-257.
A careful (but more doxography-centred) analysis can also be found in Setaioli 1988,
398-419.
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Illud ante omnia mihi dicendum est opiniones ueteres parum exactas
esse et rudes. Circa uerum adhuc errabatur; noua omnia erant primo
temptantibus; postea eadem ista limata sunt. Et, si quid inuentum est,
illis nihilominus referri debet acceptum; magni animi res fuit rerum
naturae latebras dimouere nec contentum exteriore eius aspectu intro-
spicere et in deorum secreta descendere. Plurimum ad inueniendum
contulit qui sperauit posse reperiri. Cum excusatione itaque ueteres au-
diendi sunt. Nulla res consummata est, dum incipit; nec in hac tantum
re omnium maxima atque inuolutissima, in qua, etiam cum multum
acti erit, omnis tamen aetas quod agat inueniet, sed et in omni alio
negotio longe semper a perfecto fuere principia.
First of all, I feel bound to say in general terms that the old views
are crude and inexact. As yet men were groping their way round
truth. Everything was new to those who made the rst attempt to
grasp it; only later were the subjects accurately investigated. But all
subsequent discoveries must nonetheless be set down to the credit of
those early thinkers. It was a task demanding great courage to remove
the veil that hid nature, and, not satised with a supercial view, to
look beneath the surface and dive into the secrets of the gods. A great
contribution to discovery was made by the man who rst conceived
the hope of its possibility. We must, therefore, listen indulgently
to the ancients. No subject is perfected while it is but beginning.
The truth holds not merely of the subject we are dealing with, the
greatest and most complicated of all, in which, however much may be
accomplished, every succeeding age will still nd something fresh to
accomplish. It holds alike in every other concern; the rst principles
have always been along way o from the completed science.99
Signicantly, the early philosophers of nature are referred to by
the encompassing denition of “ancients” (veteres), for they are seen
as the ancestors of present and future inquirers.100 Like the forefathers
immortalized in family portraits, they may probably appear rude or
clumsy to later observers. But while recognizing the naivity of certain
ancient ideas, Seneca is careful in proclaiming the merits of these rst
investigators as well as the enormous debt every succeeding generation
(aetas) owes them. As usual, gratitude for the past and condence in
99. QNat. 6.5.2-3.
100. As is well-known, the collective term veteres, like the more evocative maiores,
was currently employed to designate the ancestors of both individual families and the
whole community. See e.g. Cicero, Phil. 5.47; Rosc. Am. 106; De Or. 1.186.
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the future are integrated together in Senecan thought, since they are
part of the same ethical-epistemological model. The linear progression
initiated by the ancients must be carried on without interruptions, and
every descendant shall have a chance to make his personal contribution.
The properly scientic value of a similar view is evident, but a socio-
anthropological contextualization of the author’s claims – that is, a
careful recourse to the sociology of knowledge – allows us to perceive
the inuence of stratied kinship patterns.101
To all appearances, the same patterns aect the work of another
Latin author we have repeatedly mentioned in this paper, Pliny the
Elder. In the astronomical discussion in Book 2 of hisNatural History – a
discussion including the praise of Hipparchus’ foresight cited earlier102
– Pliny makes some short and penetrating remarks on the history of
scientic knowledge. Like Seneca, he pays homage to his predecessors
in spite of occasional disagreements and expresses his faith in future
developments:
In quibus (scil. in luminum occultationumque ratione) aliter multa
quam priores tradituri fatemur ea quoque illorum esse muneris qui
primi vias quaerendi demonstraverint, modo ne quis desperet saecula
procere semper.
I confess that on this matter (i.e. on the aspects and occultations of
the planets) I convey several notions dierent from my predecessors.
Nevertheless, for such notions, too, I am indebted to those who rst
showed the way to further inquiry; just let no one lose hope that
future generations will always progress.103
According to Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, «no passage of
earlier date so denitely projects the notion of boundless progress into
the future» – an opinion which, of course, implies underestimating
101. To be sure, Seneca’s works are not the only ones in Latin literature to re-
elaborate these social models. In his Brutus, for instance, Cicero had oered a compre-
hensive account of the history of Roman oratory which was greatly indebted to the
traditional idea of transgenerational reciprocity: see now Marchese 2011. In more
general terms, the essential contribution of Roman mentality to the construction of
the notion of progress has been pointed out by Novara 1982, with special regard to
the late Republican literature.
102. See above, n. 43.
103. HN 2.62 (my translation).
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Seneca’s previous statements.104 And we have already seen that in
Edelstein’s view Pliny, Seneca and Manilius simply echo a Posidonian
theory.105 On the basis of Pliny’s multi-faceted background, however,
it seems much more plausible to see in this text a terse condensation of
Greek and Roman ideals. Whatever the individual sources of Plinian
science, it is undoubted that the author continues the tradition of Hel-
lenistic scientic optimism, taking up its future-oriented epistemology.
At the same time, such a long-standing tradition variously merges
with Roman beliefs. Besides the well-known idea of a never ending
chain of generations (saecula), Pliny recalls the socially meaningful
notion of munus, that is, the notion of an interpersonal gift which is
also perceived as a duty and a service.106 By opening the way to physi-
cal research, the early thinkers assembled and transmitted a precious
patrimony which was intended to benet their successors – something
consequently arousing their descendants’ gratitude. In light of its de-
nition as a munus, however, this notable legacy also looks like an owed
service. And indeed in the Roman view every generation is expected to
increase its status for the sake of posterity. What the ancestors did, in
other words, should be wisely imitated by their faithful progeny. Like
Seneca, however, Pliny is well aware that such a desirable improvement
is far from automatic, and in several passages of his work he refers
to social, political and, above all, moral conditions which prevent the
advance of human knowledge.107 After all, if one conceives the history
104. Lovejoy and Boas 1935, 377-378. Introducing a few Senecan passages after
their discussion about Pliny, Lovejoy and Boas (who have previously emphasized
Seneca’s primitivism, 260-286) note that the Latin philosopher «expresses a similar –
though not explicitly an equally unlimited – faith in the future progress of knowledge».
105. Cf. above, n. 63.
106. See now Pereira-Menaut 2004, 213: «i munera, in termini generali, recano
in sé, implicita, la necessità del loro esercizio, del loro compiersi. Si tratta di una
obbligatorietà extra-giuridica, che nasce dal proprio essere della cosa, dell’animale o
della persona, dai quali ci si aspetta che esercitino tali funzioni».
107. In HN 2.117-118, for instance, the writer contrasts the wide-ranging research
interests of «ancient Greek authors» (auctores Graeci veteres), who carried out their
investigations in a dicult political situation «for no other reward than the good
of posterity» (sine praemio alio quam posteros iuvandi), with the negligence of his
peers. Such indolent behavior is all the more blameworthy, since Emperor Titus «takes
great delight in the progress of the State and the arts» (tam gaudente proventu rerum
artiumque principe). Cf. Naas 2011, 68: «according to Pliny, the most important
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of thought as a patiently growing heritage, depending on the willing-
ness of its owners, it is quite natural to warn against the sources of
corruption, while drawing a stimulating picture of the goals attainable
by virtuous heirs. Expressing one’s condence in the future – even in
the face of contemporary diculties – consistently contributes to this
paraenetic strategy.108
To be sure, a complex combination of Graeco-Hellenistic and Ro-
man themes can be recognized in Seneca as well. The Latin writer relies
on three main conceptual backgrounds for his creation of a powerful
model of progress: the tradition of Stoic philosophy (particularly the
tenets of the Old Stoa), the empiristic and optimistic spirit of Greek
science, and the moral patterns of Roman genealogical relationships.
Depending on the specic context in which they occur and its thematic
connections, Seneca’s claims about human progress give prominence
to one or the other of these conceptual backgrounds. In the meteoro-
logical treatment of the Natural Questions, for instance, the inuence of
Hellenistic scientic optimism seems especially noticeable, as shown
by the writer’s attitude towards previous inquirers. If in other works
ancient authorities are basically an object of praise, in the Natural
Questions eulogistic remarks are accompanied by the assertion that
the early investigators should be regarded indulgently because of the
continuous advance of knowledge. However, even when one of the
above-mentioned ideological frameworks seems to prevail, the other
advantages of Roman peace were welfare for the people and the diusion of practical
knowledge, such as remedies (HN 14.2; 27.3). But at the same time, men were not
making progress with knowledge. They were not even interested in preserving
established knowledge, although the Empire seemed to oer them the best conditions
for this, namely peace and an Emperor who supported the artes». See also 14.1-6,
where contemporary greed (causing the loss of old knowledge) is compared with «the
ancients’ more fruitful diligence» and their «more productive zeal» (tanto priscorum
cura fertilior aut industria felicior fuit). In similar texts, the paradigm of Roman
genealogy is skilfully applied to the eld of literary and scientic history, since ancient
authors – including Greek authors – are portrayed as the ancestors one should strive
to imitate.
108. Needless to say, even Pliny’s portrait of Hipparchus is likely to entail a mixture
of Hellenistic and Roman values, a mixture from which it is very hard to disentangle
single elements. This is one of the main reasons why the attempts of the Quellen-
forschung at precisely identifying the Greek components of Pliny’s text are bound to
remain on a hypothetical level.
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two are certainly present to the author’s mind, for all such elements
constitute a unitary and organic worldview.
In Epistle 64, the Roman ideal of family descendance and ancestor
worship comes explicitly to the foreground of Seneca’s argument. But
it is clear that both the paradigm of natural sciences and that of philo-
sophical learning play a prominent role as well. The detailed discussion
on the use and and possible improvement of medical knowledge stands
testimony to Seneca’s conscious integration of technical-scientic and
socio-ethical patterns on the basis of an underlying epistemological the-
ory.109 Even more noteworthy, the question of philosophical teaching
and mastery lays the foundation of the whole letter, from its start-
ing reference to Quintus Sextus’ hortatory force through to its nal
mention of several icons of Roman Stoicism (the two Catos, Laelius,
Socrates, Plato, Zeno, and Cleanthes). Indeed, the mutual interfusion of
social and philosophical models also goes so far as to involve non-Stoic
traditions. The most interesting evidence in this respect is provided by
Seneca’s positive consideration of the custom of keeping portraits of
great men and celebrating their birthdays.110 On the one hand, as men-
tioned earlier, the contemplation of imagines as a material incitement
to virtue (incitamenta animi) was a deep-rooted identitarian practice
of Roman aristocracy. On the other hand, however, Seneca’s hint at
the celebration of natales seems to allude to the Epicurean commemo-
ration of prominent gures of the school through monthly and annual
festivals. And it is well-known that the Epicureans also kept and cher-
ished inspiring portraits of their founding fathers. Both practices are
recalled (and polemically commented on) by Pliny immediately before
109. Cf. Ep. 64.8. Though Seneca makes frequent and varied use of medical notions
in his works (see e.g. Migliorini 1988 and Fasce 1994), it is especially remarkable
that such careful treatment of ophthalmological remedies occurs in a letter recalling
the heritage of Sextian philosophy. The school of the Sextii had a strong interest in
medicine and pharmacopeia, and its adherents included famous doctors like Sextius
Niger (Quintus Sextus’ son) and Celsus (who later left the school). Sextius Niger, in
particular, wrote a treatise On Materia Medica cited by Dioscorides, Pliny, and Galen.
See Capitani 1991 and Lana 1992, 115-116.
110. Ep. 64.9.
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his discussion of Roman ancestor masks.111
The insightful harmonization of dierent intellectual horizons
emerging from similar texts mirrors the depth and complexity of
Seneca’s idea of progress as well as its strict connections with the
ancient cultural milieu. In truth, it is almost impossible to understand
and interpret the author’s elated enthusiasm for the future and his
reverential worship of the past without going back to the network of
beliefs which supports such an attitude. Thus, even if it is fascinat-
ing to appreciate the inuence of Seneca’s prophecies on men like
Christopher Columbus, who derived from a famous Medea chorus «not
only a prediction of new discoveries but a celebration of the single,
heroic individual who would reveal them»,112 it is highly misleading
to assimilate ancient and modern progressivism on the basis of such
later receptions. The representation of time – be it a reconstruction of
the past, a description of the present, or an anticipation of the future –
is an intrinsically ideological activity exposed to the manipulation of
cultures, groups, and individuals. And the most stimulating possibility
111. Cf. HN 35.5. On the Epicurean community’s long-standing devotion to its
fouding fathers and related cultic practices see Capasso 1987, and Clay 1998, 62-104,
who remark on signicant sources such as Cicero, Fin. 2.101; 5.3, and Philodemus,
A.P. 11.44. The Epicurean exploitation of portraits as a source of inspiration and
incitement for the adherents was specically investigated by Frischer 1982. See now
the discussion in Gordon 2012, 139-177. Indeed, Epicurus was represented not only in
statues and paintings but even on drinking cups and rings. As Dillon 2006, 113-115,
observes, every philosophical school, including Stoicism, conveyed particular cultural
meanings through the artistic representation of its exponents. And although several
features distinguish Epicurean and Stoic types, «the portrait statues of Epicurus and
Chrysippus also have a number of important elements in common [...]. The statues
of the other certainly named third-century Epicureans Metrodorus and Hermarchus
share these elements as well. In dening visually the philosophic image, the statue
body probably played the critical signifying role».
112. Cf. Romm 1993, 84. Columbus’ reinterpretation of the Medea passage on the
discovery of new lands (375-379) is mentioned also by Motto 1993, 22-23, together
with other modern age revivals of Seneca’s progressive faith (see also QNat 1.praef.13,
on the possibility of sailing from Spain to India). As Moretti 1993, 275-278, points
out, in his Libro de las Profecías (1501-1503) Columbus «gathers a whole series of texts,
especially of biblical and patristic origin, that he reads as “prophecies” of his voyage,
thus reinterpreting his discovery sub specie theologica». Drawing on an interpolated
manuscript family which reads Tiphysque instead of Tethysque in line 378, Columbus
oers an «interpretative translation» of the chorus and presents himself as the new
Tiphys, the pilot of the legendary ship Argo.
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open to the work of scholars is the exploration of dierences and per-
mutations – of the distance between Seneca’s wandering comets and
Columbus’ own hopeful explorations.
Fabio Tutrone
University of Palermo
fabio.tutrone@unipa.it
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